Showing 11 - 20 of 44,799
This paper studies the e¤ect of social relations on the convergence to the e¢ cient equilibrium in a 2x2 coordination …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005449609
dominant Nash equilibrium together characterize the unique evolutionarily stable set in generic and symmetric n×n-coordination …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005649475
efficiency an equity of coordination. In all treatments, coordination is mostly explained by convergence in communication. We … multi-player coordination game with conflicting preferences. Network structure matters but the interaction between network … coordination and distribution of coordinated outcomes across networks. But increasing the communication length improves both …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008587475
We consider coordination situations with a conflict of interest, and experimentally vary the inefficiency of an equal … is not extremely inefficient, remains very salient, and primarily because it offers players a way to avoid a coordination …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010890958
This paper reinterprets the ? -core (Chander and Tulkens (1995, 1997)) and justifies it as well as its prediction that the efficient coalition structure is stable in terms of the coalition formation theory. It is assumed that coalitions can freely merge or break apart, are farsighted (that is,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011325128
ambiguity on peace-making are examined. It is shown that ambiguity may select equilibria in coordination games with multiple …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011422157
ambiguity on peace-making are examined. It is shown that ambiguity may select equilibria in coordination games with multiple …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010333999
The equilibrium outcome of a strategic interaction between two or more people may depend on the weight they place on each other's payoff. A positive, negative or zero weight represents altruism, spite or complete selfishness, respectively. Paradoxically, the real, material payoff in equilibrium...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010336031
Response times are a simple low-cost indicator of the process of reasoning in strategic games (Rubinstein, 2007; Rubinstein, 2016). We leverage the dynamic nature of response-time data from repeated strategic interactions to measure the strategic complexity of a situation by how long people think on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011653246
The value is a solution concept for n-person strategic games, developed by Nash, Shapley, and Harsanyi. The value of a game is an a priori evaluation of the economic worth of the position of each player, reflecting the players' strategic possibilities, including their ability to make threats...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013189026