This paper presents a dynamic, stochastic game-theoretic model of financial fragility. The model has two essential features. First, interrelated portfolios and payment commitments forge financial linkages among agents. Second, iid shocks to investment projects’ operations at a single date...

The standard model of repeated games assumes perfect synchronization in the timing of decisions between the players. In many natural settings, however, choices are made synchronously so that only one player can move at a given time. This paper studies a family of repeated settings in which...

This paper examines characteristics of cooperative behavior in a repeated, n-person, continuous action generalization of a Prisoner?s Dilemma game. When time preferences are heterogeneous and bounded away from one, how ?much? cooperation can be achieved by an ongoing group? How does group...

Foreign tax credit systems limit the extent to which foreign tax credits can be used to offset tax liability in the taxpayer's home country. We examine how two methods of limiting foreign tax credits, separate limitations based on type or source of income or an overall limitation aggregating...

Foreign tax credit systems limit the extent to which foreign tax credits can be used to offset tax liability in the taxpayer’s home country. We examine how two methods of limiting foreign tax credits, separate limitations based on type or source of income or an overall limitation aggregating...