While a basic theoretical principle in public economics assumes that individuals’ behaviour is fully-optimizer with respect to the introduction of a tax, an increasing body of research is presenting evidence that agents decision making is often affected by non-negligible cognitive biases,...

We investigate, by mean of a lab experiment, a market inspired by two strands of literature on one hand we have herd behaviour in non-market situations, and on the other hand aggregation of private information in markets. The former suggests that socially undesirable herd behaviour may result...

We analysed dyads strategies in one-shot public goods game. By means of a laboratory experiment, using a variant of the strategy-method, we found that more than one third of the dyads are conditional cooperators, whereas 18% can be categorised as free riders.

In this paper, we first replicated Harrison et al. (2012). Then, we studied if the group’s size has an impact on group’s risk aversion. In line with Harrison et al. (2012), our results confirm that no significant differences occur between individuals and groups risk aversion in three-person...

The theoretical approach in dealing with the aggregation of information in markets in general, and financial markets in particular considers information as an exogenous element to the system, focusing just on conditions and consequences of the efficient incorporation of information into prices....

Over recent years, parking policy has become a key element of urban transport policy and planning in many countries. The need of urban mobility, mostly guaranteed by private cars, in facts, impacts on the policy and regulations of parking areas. The issue is particularly relevant for work...

The aim of this paper is to analyze bidders’ behavior, comparing individuals and groups’ decisions within the dollar auction framework. This game induces subjects to fall prey into the paradigm of escalation, which is driven by agents’ commitment to higher and higher bids. Whenever each...

In his ‘Simple model of herd behaviour’, Banerjee (1992) shows that – in a sequential game – if the first two players have chosen the same action, all subsequent players will ignore their own information and start a herd, an irreversible one. The points of strength of Banerjee’s model...

This paper purports to provide some evidence on the effect of rating agencies on herding in financial markets. By means of a laboratory experiment, we investigate the effect and interaction between private and public information. Previous experiments showed that lemmings behaviour can survive in...

While a basic theoretical principle in public economics assumes that individuals' behaviour is fully-optimizer with respect to the introduction of a tax, an increasing body of research is presenting evidence that agents decision making is often affected by non-negligible cognitive biases, which...