In his ‘Simple model of herd behaviour’, Banerjee (1992) shows that – in a sequential game – if the first two players have chosen the same action, all subsequent players will ignore their own information and start a herd, an irreversible one. The points of strength of Banerjee’s model...

We introduce cheap talk in a dynamic investment model with information externalities. We first show how social learning adversely affects the credibility of cheap talk messages. Next, we show how an informational cascade makes thruthtelling incentive compatible. A separating equilibrium only...

This paper provides a survey of recent theories of herding behaviour, bridging two rather distants strands of literature (roughly, American and European). In the first part of the paper the explanation is based on the idea of asymmetric information and principal-agent approach; these could lead...

We introduce cheap talk in a dynamic investment model with information externalities. We first show how social learning adversely affects the credibility of cheap talk messages. Next, we show how an informational cascade makes truthtelling incentive compatible. A separating equilibrium only...

The article examines the presence of herd behaviour in the emerging Indian stock market. Using daily data of S&P CNX Nifty 50 index of the National Stock Exchange over 1997–2012 and by employing Kalman filter, we investigate for the presence of herding. The article finds that the...

In his "Simple model of herd behaviour", Banerjee (1992) shows that - in a sequential game - if the first two players have chosen the same action, player 3 and all subsequent players will ignore his/her own information and start a herd, an irreversible one. In this paper we analyse the role...

In his ‘Simple model of herd behaviour’, Banerjee (1992) shows that – in a sequential game – if the first two players have chosen the same action, all subsequent players will ignore their own information and start a herd, an irreversible one. The points of strength of Banerjee’s model...

In an economy à la Diamond and Dybvig (1983), we present an example in which foreign lenders find it profitable to invest in an emerging market if, and only if, the emerging market government imposes taxes on short-term capital inflows. This implies that capital controls that are effective in...

This paper studies dynamic pricing by a monopolist selling to buyers who learn from each other’s purchases. The price posted in each period serves to extract rent from the current buyer, as well as to control the amount of information transmitted to future buyers. As information increases...

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to examine the investment behavior of Pakistani stock market participants, specifically with respect to their tendency to exhibit herd behavior. Design/methodology/approach – The study employed two different methodologies suggested by Christie and Huang...