In a version of the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) model with aggregate uncertainty, we show that there exists an equilibrium with the following properties: all consumers deposit at the bank, all patient consumers wait for the last period to withdraw, and the bank fails with strictly positive...

We argue that it is natural to study social institutions within the framework of standard game theory (i.e., only by resorting to concepts like players, actions, strategies, information sets, payoff functions, and stochastic processes describing the moves of nature, which constitute a stochastic...

We show that every bounded, continuous at infinity game of perfect information has an epsilon-perfect equilibrium. Our method consists of approximating the payoff function of each player by a sequence of simple functions, and to consider the corresponding sequence of games, each differing form...

We show that monetary trading is simple, self-enforcing, symmetric, and irreducible in a natural framework. Furthermore, we show that the utility for each economic agent is at least as big under the monetary system as under any other simple, self-enforcing, symmetric, and irreducible trading...

We study whether we can weaken the conditions given in Reny (1999) and still obtain existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria in quasiconcave normal form games, or, at least, existence of pure strategy $\varepsilon-$equilibria for all epsilon0. We show by examples that there are: (1)...

We consider Salim Rashid's asymptotic version of David Schmeidler's theorem on the purification of Nash equilibria. We show that, in contrast to what is stated, players' payoff functions have to be selected from an equicontinuous family in order for Rashid's theorem to hold. That is, a bound on...

We consider an asymptotic version of Mas-Colell's theorem on the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria in large games. Our result states that, if players' payoff functions are selected from an equicontinuous family, then all sufficiently large games have an epsilon - pure, epsilon -...

We show that a distribution of a game with a continuum of players is an equilibrium distribution if and only if there exists a sequence of symmetric approximate equilibrium distributions of games with finite support that converges to it. Thus, although not all games have symmetric equilibrium...

Random matching models have been used in Monetary Economics to argue that money can increase the well being of all agents in the economy. If the model features a finite number of agents it will be shown that there is an equilibrium, analogous to the contagious equilibria described in Kandori...

We show that a strategy is a Nash equilibrium in a game with a continuum of players if and only if there exists a sequence of finite games such that its restriction is an $\varepsilon_n$-equilibria, with $\varepsilon_n$ converging to zero. In our characterization, the sequence of finite games...