Standard models of moral hazard predict a negative relationship between risk and incentives, but the empirical work has … incentives decreases with risk aversion, more risk-averse agents prefer lower-incentive contracts; thus, in the optimal contract …, incentives are positively correlated with endogenous risk. In contrast, if risk aversion is high enough, the possibility of …

assumption, which we relax. We find that, although monetary incentives are effective also with sociallyattentive agents, the … monetary incentives. We also show that the principal benefits from having a socially-attentive agent and how she optimally …

separately and study issues of adverse selection (sorting) and moral hazard (incentives). We find that managers select contracts … incentives to do so (shirking). As a result, the market is skeptical of incentive benefits. Thus, while we find evidence of …

A substantial body of research investigates the design of incentives in firms, yet less is known about incentives in …. Third, contrary to existing laboratory evidence, financial incentives do not crowd out intrinsic motivation in this setting. < …

A substantial body of research investigates the design of incentives in firms, yet less is known about incentives in …. Third, contrary to existing laboratory evidence, financial incentives do not crowd out intrinsic motivation in this setting. …

leads to weaker incentives for effort, compared with non-integration. Our theory makes minimal assumptions about the … managers. The division managers' job is to create profitable investment projects. Giving the managers incentives to do so …' incentives. The resulting tradeoff between a better use of resources and diminished incentives for effort determines whether …

When designing incentives for a manager, the trade-off between insurance and a good allocation of effort across various …