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We use experiments to test comparative statics predictions of canonical tournament theory. Both the roles of principal and agent are populated by human subjects, allowing us to test predictions for both incentive responses and optimal tournament design. Consistent with theory, we observed an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009646321
It is suggested that individual behavior under ambiguity, or knightian uncertainty, may represent an alternative explanation for contractual incompleteness with respect to the traditional approach in terms of transactions costs. This paper aims at showing that the introduction of ambiguity in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009649880
An entrepreneur with information about firm quality seeks financing from an uninformed investor in order to pay a worker. I show that if the worker, too, knows the true quality of the firm, then certain long term wage agreements can credibly signal firm quality. Such wage agreements have a low...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008776036
Incentives often fail in inducing economic agents to engage in a desirable activity; implementability is restricted …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008782828
account for student heterogeneity. Yet doing so introduces potential dynamic distortions to incentives: teachers may be less …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010548095
Kim (1995) provides a sufficient condition to rank information systems when the first-order approach is valid. The basis for the condition is the comparison of the likelihood ratio distributions. I show, first, that Kim’s criterion is not necessary when the limited liability of the agent...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010608093
This paper analyzes the impact of market structure on career concerns. Effort increases the probability that a skilled agent achieves a one-time breakthrough. Wages are based on assessed ability and on expected output. For any wage, the agent works too little, too late. Under short-term...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010895652
Empirical evidence shows that workers care about the mission of their job in addition to their wage. This suggests that employers can use the job mission to incentivize and screen their workers. I study a model in which a principal selects an agent to develop a project and influences the agent's...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010941147
We study a principal-agent model in which the agent can provide ex post additional relevant information regarding his performance. In particular, he can provide a legitimate excuse, that is, evidence that a poor result is only due to factors outside his control. However, building a convincing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010877776
incentives for effort delay, but also decreases the probability that the project will be terminated in due time. In this trade …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010888679