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Subjective evaluations with performance feedback

Zabojnik, Jan - 2011

efficiency. However, fully efficient incentives are achievable if the firm can commit to a forced distribution of evaluations and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010290366

Balancing performance measures when agents behavecompetitively in an environment with technologicalinterdependencies

Sandner, Kai J. - Universität <München> / Fakultät für Betriebswirtschaft - 2008

This paper addresses the question, what metrics should be used for performance evaluationand in particular how they should be weighted and combined in the presence oftechnological interdependencies when the agents exhibit variedly strong developed rivalry.1 It is further examined, whether the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009418821

Hidden Action, Identification, and Organization Design

Schnedler, Wendelin - Alfred-Weber-Institut für Sozial- und … - 2010

Incentives often fail in inducing economic agents to engage in a desirableactivity; implementability is restricted …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009248992

Relational Contracts and Inequity Aversion

Kragl, Jenny; Schmid, Julia - Sonderforschungsbereich Ökonomisches Risiko <Berlin> - 2006

We study the effects of envy on the feasibility of relational contracts in a standard moral hazard setup with two agents. Performance is evaluated via an observable, but non-contractible signal which reflects the agent's individual contribution to form value. Both agents exhibit disadvantageous...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005857794

Promotion Tournaments and Individual Performance Pay

Schöttner, Anja; Thiele, Veikko - Sonderforschungsbereich Ökonomisches Risiko <Berlin> - 2007

principal does not provide individual incentives if it is sufficiently important topromote the most suitable candidate. Thus, we …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005860989

Task Difficulty,Performance Measure Characteristicsand the Trade-Off betweenInsurance and Well-Allocated Effort

Schnedler, Wendelin - Alfred-Weber-Institut für Sozial- und … - 2006

When designing incentives for a manager, the trade-off between insuranceand a “good” allocation of effort across …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005868463

Promotion tournaments and individual performance pay

Schöttner, Anja (contributor); Thiele, Veikko (contributor) - 2007

the principal does not provide individual incentives if it is sufficiently important to promote the most suitable …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003634017

Task difficulty, performance measure characteristics, and the trade-off between insurance and well-allocated effort

Schnedler, Wendelin (contributor) - 2006

When designing incentives for a manager, the trade-off between insurance and a "good" allocation of effort across … ; multitasking ; incentives …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003323166

Resource allocation and organizational form

Friebel, Guido; Raith, Michael - 2009 - Rev.

We develop a theory of firm scope and structure in which merging two firms allows the integrated firm's top management to allocate resources that are costly to trade. However, information about their use resides with division managers. We show that establishing truthful upward communication...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003888114

Resource allocation and firm scope

Friebel, Guido (contributor); Raith, Michael (contributor) - 2006

leads to weaker incentives for effort, compared with non-integration. Our theory makes minimal assumptions about the … managers. The division managers' job is to create profitable investment projects. Giving the managers incentives to do so …' incentives. The resulting tradeoff between a better use of resources and diminished incentives for effort determines whether …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003464116