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We consider a situation where an agent's effort is monitored by a supervisor who cares for the agent's well being. This is modeled by incorporating the agent's utility into the utility function of the supervisor. The first best solution can be implemented even if the supervisor's preferences are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010365849
In this paper, a principal's decision between delegating two tasks or handling one of the two tasks herself is analyzed. We assume that the principal uses both, formal contracts and informal agreements sustained by the value of future relationships (relational contracts) as incentive device. It...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010365874
An advisor is supposed to recommend a financial product in the best interest of her client. However, the best product for the client may not always be the product yielding the highest commission to the advisor. Do advisors nevertheless provide truthful advice? If not, will a voluntary or...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011530061
. Incentives of advisors and clients may not be aligned, when fees are used by financial institutions to steer advice. We …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011530065
This paper analyzes the impact of agents' risk aversion and other agency parameters on optimal bias in the performance measures used for incentive contracts. Prior research has shown that the limited liability of the agent results in a demand for accounting systems that are stringent compared to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011544458
I analyze a model in which a principal offers a contract to an agent and can influence the agent’s marginal return of effort by the choice of the project mission. The principal's and the agents' mission preferences are misaligned, and the agents have unobservable intrinsic motivation levels. I...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011561184
incentives for effort delay, but also decreases the probability that the project will be terminated in due time. In this trade …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010419648
Incentives often fail in inducing economic agents to engage in a desirable activity; implementability is restricted …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008758145
. Incentives of advisors and clients may not be aligned, when fees are used by financial institutions to steer advice. We …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009515366
's type, a selfish principal has to rely on explicit incentives. A fair principal, by contrast, can effectively induce … implicit incentives and hence does not need to use explicit incentives. Interestingly, if a selfish principal can rely on more … effective explicit incentives, a fair principal becomes more likely to be able to separate from the selfish type and, hence, to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009518322