Investors typically base executive compensation on performance measures reported by managers and verified by third-party monitors. This paper explicitly examines how compensation influences the reporting behavior of managers and auditors and finds that (1) strengthening the link between pay and...

We examine the characteristics of endogenously-determined optimal incentive contracts for agents who envy each other and work for a risk-neutral (non-envious) principal. Envy makes each agent care not only about absolute consumption but also about relative consumption. Incentive contracts in...

This paper explores the interaction between the internal corporate control mechanism of acquiring firms - managerial ownership and board dismissal of managers - and the incidence of efficient takeovers under asymmetric information about the type of manager of the acquiring firms. The internal...

An important question for firms in dynamic industries is how to induce a CEO to reveal information that the firm should change its strategy, in particular when a strategy change might cause his own dismissal. We show that the uniquely optimal incentive scheme from this perspective consists of...

This study examines the widespread belief that executive pay should reflect firm performance. We compile a hand-collected data set of compensation paid to executive directors of Dutch listed companies and analyze if executive compensation is indeed determined by firm performance. A variety of...

As Enron collapsed in the Summer and Fall of 2001, most Wall Street analysts maintained either buy or strong buy recommendations for Enron common stock. The largest bankruptcy in U.S. history was often described as coming without warning, as $60 billion in market capitalization vanished. We...