Similar Search Results

Sabotage in Tournaments: Making the Beautiful Game a Bit Less Beautiful

Garicano, Luis; Palacios-Huerta, Ignacio - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005

obtain evidence on the effect of stronger incentives on productive and destructive effort. Using as control the behavior of … the same teams in a competition that experienced no changes in incentives, we provide differences-in-differences estimates …, and that indeed attendance suffered as a result of the incentive change. Thus, teams responded to stronger incentives, but …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114301

Task Difficulty, Performance Measure Characteristics, and the Trade-Off between Insurance and Well-Allocated Effort

Schnedler, Wendelin - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2006

When designing incentives for a manager, the trade-off between insurance and a “good” allocation of effort across …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005566602

No margin, no mission? A Field Experiment on Incentives for Pro-Social Tasks

Ashraf, Nava; Bandiera, Oriana; Jack, Kelsey - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

A substantial body of research investigates the design of incentives in firms, yet less is known about incentives in …. Third, contrary to existing laboratory evidence, financial incentives do not crowd out intrinsic motivation in this setting. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083234

Incentive design and mis-allocated effort : conference paper

Schnedler, Wendelin - 2013 - Preliminary version

Incentives often distort behavior: they induce agents to exert effort but this effort is not employed optimally. This …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010344596

Information Aggregation and Adverse Selection

Boukouras, Aristotelis; Koufopoulos, Kostas - 2011

We consider a general economy, where agents have private information about their types. Types can be multi-dimensional and potentially interdependent. We show that, if the interim distribution of types is common knowledge (the exact number of agents for each type is known), then a mechanism...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010329994

Signaling under double-crossing preferences

Chen, Chia-hui; Ishida, Junichiro; Suen, Wing-chuen - 2020

This paper provides a general analysis of signaling under doublecrossing preferences with a continuum of types. There are natural economic environments where indifference curves of two types cross twice, so that the celebrated single-crossing property fails to hold. Equilibrium exhibits a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012543995

Information aggregation and adverse selection

Boukouras, Aristotelis; Koufopoulos, Kostas - 2011 - This Version: 07 December 2010, First Version: 24 July 2007

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010345986

Signaling under double-crossing preferences

Chen, Chia-hui; Ishida, Junichiro; Suen, Wing-chuen - 2020

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012291224

Efficient Allocations in Economies with Asymmetric Information when the Realized Frequency of Types is Common Knowledge

Boukouras, Aristotelis; Koufopoulos, Kostas - Department of Economics, Leicester University - 2015

We consider a general economy, where agents have private information about their types. Types can be multi-dimensional and potentially interdependent. We show that, if the realized frequency of types (the exact number of agents for each type) is common knowledge, then a mechanism exists, which...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011265724

Taxable Cash Dividends

Bechman, Ken L.; Raaballe, Johannes - Copenhagen Business School - 2006

Firms pay out cash using both dividends and share repurchases. In many aspects these two means are similar, but one important difference is that dividends are generally taxed more heavily than share repurchases. Nevertheless firms persist in paying out large amounts in dividends. This paper...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005644719