We study the problem of allocating m identical items among n m agents with unit demand and private value for consuming the good. We allow payments and focus on dominant-strategy implementation. In the absence of an auctioneer who can absorb payments collected from the agents, the payments must...

We analyse assignment problems in which not all agents are controlled by the central planner. The autonomous agents search for vacant tasks guided by their own preference orders defined over subsets of the available tasks. The goal of the central planner is to maximise the total value of the...

The implausibility of the extreme rationality assumptions of Nash equilibrium has been attested by numerous experimental studies with human players. In particular, the fundamental social dilemmas such as the Traveler's dilemma, the Prisoner's dilemma, and the Public Goods game demonstrate high...

We analyse assignment problems in which not every agent is controlled by the central planner. The autonomous agents search for vacant tasks guided by their own preference orders over available tasks. The goal of the central planner is to maximise the total value of the assignment, taking into...

We study the problem of allocating m identical items among n m agents with unit demand and private value for consuming the good. We allow payments and focus on dominant{strategy implementation. In the absence of an auctioneer who can absorb payments collected from the agents, the payments must...

We study the problem of allocating m identical items among nm agents with unit demand and private value for consuming the good. We allow payments and focus on dominant-strategy implementation. In the absence of an auctioneer who can absorb payments collected from the agents, the payments must be...