Information sharing between governments is examined in an optimal-taxation framework. We introduce a taxonomy of alternative systems of international capital-income taxation and characterize the choice of tax rates and information exchange. The model reproduces the conclusion found in earlier...

In this paper we analyze the structure of contest equilibria with a variable number of individuals. First we analyze a situation where the total prize depends on the number of agents and where every single agent faces opportunity costs of investing in the contest. Second we analyze a situation...

This paper examines information sharing between governments in an optimal taxation framework. We present a taxonomy of alternative systems of international capital income taxation and characterize the choice of tax rates and information exchange. The model reproduces the conclusion of the...

The issue of capital tax competition in source-based capital taxes is viewed to be unproblematic if residence-based capital taxation exists. The sustainability, however, of residence-based capital taxation depends on the co-operation of source countries to assist in collecting tax revenues that...

This paper analyzes the impact of tax competition between two countries of unequal per-capita capital endownments on tax rates and efficiency when distorting wage, residence-based and source-based capital taxes (or any combination of two instruments) are available for governments. The national...

Models of international tax competition typically assume the existence of a benevolent government. This paper presents a model which integrates the view of government as source of inefficiency with an analysis of distorting taxes on capital investment, savings and labor income in a common...