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The present paper analyzes situations in which groups compete for rents. A major result in the literature has been that there are both cases where larger groups have advantages and cases where they have disadvantages. The paper provides two intuitive criteria which for groups with homogenous...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008853859
We analyze a Tullock-type takeover contest between two CEOs. To deter wasteful influence activities in shareholder optimum, the parachute compensates the (potentially) foregone earnings of the contestant whose incentives to invest in such activities are strongest. Therefore, the parachute is...
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In an environment with asymmetric information and intragenerational externalities, the implementation of a first-best efficient Clarke-Groves- Vickrey mechanism may not be feasible if it has to be self-financing. By using intergenerational transfers, the arising budget deficit can be covered in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010762287
This article summarizes the major findings from the economic and socio-biological theories of group conflicts and contrasts them with findings from sociology and social psychology, especially the relationship between group size and group success. The predictive power of some of the results of...
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In this paper we deal with voluntary and compulsory redistribution in an economy where the enforcement of property rights is costly. Two agents engage in a common-pool contest and two types of potential distortions arise: the waste of resources in the contest and the dilution of incentives to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004989601
The purpose of this paper is twofold. We first develop a contractarian theory of redistribution. The existence of rules of redistribution is explained without any recourse to the risk-aversion of individuals. Hence, we depart from the standard legitimization of redistribution as fundamental...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004989639
The two basic systems according to which pay-as-you-go-financed public-pension systems can be organized are the (Anglo-Saxon) Beveridge system and the (continental) Bismarck system. An ideal Beveridge system provides flat-rate benefits, whereas an ideal Bismarck system provides earnings-related...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004994467