We study a general equilibrium model in which entrepreneurs finance investment with optimal financial contracts. Because of enforceability problems, contracts are constrained efficient. We show that limited enforceability amplifies the impact of technological innovations on aggregate output....

We study a general equilibrium model in which entrepreneurs finance investment with optimal financial contracts. Because of enforceability problems, contracts are constrained efficient. We show that limited enforceability amplifies the impact of technological innovations on aggregate output....

A financial stability fund set by a union of sovereign countries (e.g. the European Stability Mechanism), can improve countries's ability to borrow and lend, and to share risks, with respect to debt financing. Efficiency gains arise from the ability of the fund to offer long-term financial...

Presentation of some new results showing how, under very general conditions, the recursive saddle-point method, pioneered by Marcet and Marimon, delivers the appropriate solution for contracting problems with intertemporal incentive constraints, with or without unique solutions. These results...

the problem of general vs. firm-specific human capital investments.

We analyze an economy where banks are uncertain about firms' investment opportunities and, as a result, credit tightness can result in excessive risk-taking. In the competitive credit market, banks announce credit contracts and firms apply to them, as in a directed search model. We show that...

This paper studies the consequences of capital markets liberalization for global imbalances (non-zero foreign asset positions) when countries are heterogeneous in the degree of financial market development. Countries characterized by more advanced financial markets tend to accumulate large...