We develop a model of insider trading where agents have private information either about liquidation value or about supply and behave strategically to maximize their profits. The supply informed trader plays a dual role in market making and in information revelation. This trader not only reveals...

We propose a model based on competitive markets in order to analyze an economy with several principals and agents. We model the principal-agent economy as a two-sided matching game and characterize the set of stable outcomes of this principal-agent matching market. A simple mechanism to...

A signalling model is developed to investigate the consequences of corporate income taxation in the presence of adverse selection in the equity market. The model obtains a unique, informationally-constrained efficient equilibrium in which a better quality firm retains more inside-equity, and, as...

This paper develops a signaling model to investigate a firm's optimal financial response to corporate income taxation under informational asymmetries. The model obtains informationally constrained efficient equilibria in which a firm's debt level and inside equity position jointly serve as a...

I analyze a market in which a price-taking buyer buys a variable-quality good from a population of sellers, contrasting the case where quality is a seller's private information to that where it is public information. Average quality traded under private information can be either higher (quality...

Cet article analyse l'utilisation efficace de l'information dans un problème de principal agent avec risque moral et neutralité au risque. On montre que, pour un système arbitraire d'information, toute l'information pertinente d'un point de vue incitatif peut être résumée par une...

We model a simple justice system in which a jury is mandated by society to assess the guilt and the punishment of an accused. Jurors are assumed to be almost perfect representatives of society, but they ignore the cost to society of implementing the sentence. As a result the jury is shown to...

We study the cost-of-adjustment model of investment when there is asymmetry of information between owners (the principal) and managers (the agent). Information asymmetry distorts the relationship between investment and the cost of capital for all agent types, and a regime of inaction appears...

The objective of this note is to analyze some implications of the model of commodity money described in Banerjee and Maskin (1996) which may seem paradoxical. In order to do this, we incorporate a general production cost structure into the model. We focus on two different results. First, the...

I develop an overlapping-generations framework in which changes in lending standards generate endogenous cycles. In my economy, entrepreneurs who are privately informed about the quality of their projects need to borrow funds. Intermediaries screen entrepreneurs both through the amount of...