We consider the problem of a monopolist---choosing an optimal nonlinear pricing scheme---facing two consumers who can resell some or all of the goods to each other in a secondary market. We suppose that the valuations of the consumers are drawn independently from a continuous distribution. We...

Motivated by sponsored search auctions with hard budget constraints given by the advertisers, we study multi-unit auctions of a single item. An important example is a sponsored result slot for a keyword, with many units representing its nventory in a month, say. In this single-item multi-unit...

This paper examines the importance of establishment-level discrete and occasional capital adjustments for aggregate business cycle dynamics. Generalized (S,s) investment rules arise through nonconvex costs of capital adjustment within an otherwise standard equilibrium business cycle model, and...

We consider a rationing mechanism for selling a common-value object. Under certain conditions, the seller earns higher revenue from rationing the object, rather than holding a second-price auction. The mechanism is formally equivalent to dividing the object into k units, and allocating (1/k)...