Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Rochester. Dept. of Economics, 1982.

Till the early-1990s the collectively-bargained labor contract (between the trade-union that presented the employees, and the employer or the employers'-association) was the norm, granting salaried workers a stable and protected labor contract. Thereafter, and more significantly after 1995, the...

The present paper develops a simple asymmetrical informational model that allows us to understand the individual´s willingness to participate in a strike. We develop and compare two signaling models of strikes: in one, firms are able to monitor and enforce hours and offer different workweeks to...

One major argument to legitimize the transfer system in European club football is that transfer fees paid by hiring clubs result in a redistribution of revenues from large market to small market clubs, which may lead to more intense on-field competition. We investigate this claim using a unique...

Previous literature on the effect of tenured and tenure-track vs. non-tenure-track professors on students' performance at university finds contrasting results. Our paper is the first to test whether tenured/tenure-track and non-tenure-track teachers differently affect students' performance at...

This study examines the association between investments in automation technologies and employment outcomes at the firm level, utilizing a panel dataset of about 10,450 Italian firms. Focusing on the proliferation of non-standard, flexible labor contracts introduced by labor market reforms in the...

Till the early-1990s the collectively-bargained labor contract (between the trade-union that presented the employees, and the employer or the employers'-association) was the norm, granting salaried workers a stable and protected labor contract. Thereafter, and more significantly after 1995, the...

Using the Colombian Annual Manufacturing Survey (AMS) between 2000 and 2014, this paper investigates the effect of labor contract modalities on firm productivity within the industrial sector through a structural model. We find that temporary workers contribute to firms' labor productivity to a...

In an economy with imperfect labor contracts, differences in the distribution of talent can be an independent source of comparative advantage. I study a world economy with two activities, one in which an individual's contribution to production can be measured accurately and another in which...

We show that when the researcher’s (observable but not contractible) contribution to innovation is crucial, a covenant not to compete (CNC) reduces e.ort and profits under both spot and relational contracts. Having no CNC allows the researcher to leave for a rival. This alleviates a commitment...