This paper provides a theoretical foundation for Markov (perfect) equilibria in repeated games with asynchronous moves that is based on memory costs. We show that if players incur a ``complexity cost'' which depends on the memory length required by their strategies, then any rationalizable...

Earlier experiments have shown that under little information subjects are hardly able to coordinate even though there are no conflicting interests and subjects are organised in fixed pairs. This is so, even though a simple adjustment process would lead the subjects into the efficient, fair and...

We analyze a model of repeated bilateral trade with moral hazard, where the quality of goods received can differ from the quality despatched due to deterioration during transportation. Since the sender does not observe the quality of good received and the receiver does not observe the quality...

This study investigates the performance of Gale-Shapley matching in an evolutionary market context. Computational experimental findings are reported for an evolutionary match-and-play trade network game in which resource-constrained traders repeatedly choose and refuse trade partners in...

A repeated moral hazard setting in which the Principal privately observes the Agentfs output is studied. It is shown that there is no loss from restricting the analysis to contracts in which the Agent is supposed to exert effort every period, receives a constant efficiency wage and no feedback...

Gul (Econometrica, 1989) introduces a non-cooperative bargaining procedure and claims that the payoffs of the resulting efficient stationary subgame perfect equilibria are close to the Shapley value of the underlying transferable utility game (when the discount factor is close to 1). We exhibit...

The central concept of noncooperative game theory is that of the \emph{strategic equilibrium} (or Nash equilibrium, or noncooperative equilibrium). In this chapter we discuss some of the conceptual issues surrounding this concept and its refinements. Many of these issues have received increasing...

The economic cost of the U.S. health care system goes beyond the cost of prescription drugs, doctor office visits and surgical procedures/ medical image tests. The implicit part of the cost includes the global competitiveness that the U.S. loses being an industrialized economy. The high health...

In this paper we are interested in the social choice theory of allocating resources, which are available and can be consumed in integer units only. Since goods are available in integer units only, the social choice theory for such problems cannot exploit any smoothness property, which may...

In this paper we show that a feasible price allocation pair is a market equilibrium of a discrete market game if and only if it solves a linear programming problem. We use this result to obtain computable necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of market equilibrium. We assume that...