This paper provides an economic framework within which to consider the effectiveness and limitations of auction markets. The paper looks at the use of auctions as a policy instrument and the effects of auction design on consumer interests, the efficient allocation of resources, and industry...

We consider an augmented version of the symmetric private value auction model with independent types. The augmentation, intended to illustrate reality, concerns information bidders have about their opponents. To the standard assumption that every bidder knows his type and the distribution of...

We consider an exchange economy under incomplete financial markets with purely financial securities and finitely many agents. When portfolios are not constrained, Cass (1984), Duffie (1987) and Florenzano--Gourdel (1992) proved that arbitrage-free security prices fully characterize equilibrium...

We study the influence of the female labor participation in the household expenditure allocation, considering the joint decision between consumption and leisure. The theoretical framework is a collective model in which the agents are the man and the woman and it is assumed that the result of...

The journal acquisition budget of libraries is not increasing at the same rate as subscription rates creating the serials' crisis. Many solutions have been proposed including the freely available electronic journal. However, all the solutions suffer the same Faustian Grip - namely that the...

We analyze the role resale creates for zero-value bidders, called speculators, in standard auctions with symmetric independent private values buyers. English/second-price auctions always have equilibria with active resale markets and positive profits for a speculator. In first- price/Dutch...

The variety-seeking behavior and the brand choice among the consumers have been discussed extensively in the previous research contributions from the stochastic point of view. This study argues that although consumers are seeking novelty and unexpectedness in a brand that they have not bought...

I describe a simple two-stage mechanism, the compensation mechanism, that implements efficient allocations in economic environments involving externalities. The compensation mechanism can be used to solve a wide variety of externalities problems, including the standard problem of public goods...

We construct Edgeworth exchange economies equivalent to demand and supply environments typically used in bargaining models and market experiments. This formulation clearly delineates environment, institution, and behavior for these models and experiments. To illustrate, we examine results by...

This is the second paper from a series of articles on governing of different types of transactions in Bulgarian farming applying the framework of New Institutional and Transaction Cost Economics. It is based on a large scale microeconomic data from 194 typical commercial farms of different sizes...