We present an experimental test of a shirking model where monitoring intensity is endogenous and effort a continuous variable. Wage level, monitoring intensity and consequently the desired enforceable effort level are jointly determined by the maximization problem of the firm. As a result,...

We analyse the implications of habit formation relating to wages in a multi-period efficiency-wage model. If employees have such preferences, their existence provides firms with incentives to raise wages and reduce employment over time. Greater intensity does not necessarily have the same...

We analyse the implications of habit formation relating to wages in a multi-period efficiency-wage model. If employees have such preferences, their existence provides firms with incentives to raise wages and reduce employment over time. Greater intensity does not necessarily have the same...

Efficiency wage theory predicts that the wage per unit of effort will be lower in intensively monitored sectors. This wage differential will increase in effort. Using employer-employee matched data from Ghana we provide evidence supporting this hypothesis.

In this paper we investigate the quantitative importance of e fficiency wages in explaining fluctuations in Bulgarian labor markets. This is done by augmenting an otherwise standard real business cycle model a la Long and Plosser (1983) with unobservable workers e ort by employers and wage...

In this paper we introduce reciprocity in labor relations and government sector to in- vestigate how well the real wage rigidity that results out of that arrangement explains business cycle fluctuations in Bulgaria. The reciprocity mechanism described in this paper follows Danthine and Kurmann...

Given asymmetric information, this paper explores the need for non-tenure-track jobs in academia alongside the usual tenure-track positions. It also explains the coexistence of these two types of jobs in research universities as an equilibrium phenomenon. The increased effort needed to produce...

The purpose of this note is to explore the problem of non-convex labor supply decision in an economy with imperfect observability of work e ffort, and the need to use e fficiency wages to prevent shirking as in Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984). In addition, the paper and explicitly performs the...

In this paper we introduce reciprocity in labor relations and government sector to investigate how well the real wage rigidity that results out of that arrangement explains business cycle fluctuations in Bulgaria. The reciprocity mechanism described in this paper follows Danthine and Kurmann...

We implement a laboratory experiment in which a principal has to decide on monitoring intensity and pay to investigate whether they are complements or substitutes. Wage level, monitoring intensity, and consequently the desired enforceable effort level are jointly determined by the maximization...