Using a structural model of the interactions between governments, firms and insurance companies, we characterise the distortions in environmental liability sharing between firms and insurance companies that the imperfect implementation of government policies implies. These distortions stem from...

We investigate the behavior of a polluting monopolist whose production causes a global damage affecting consumers and non-consumers alike while consumption causes a specific damage affecting consumers only. The monopolist anticipates strategically how her decisions on product variant, price and...

In this paper, we first review in this paper some general principles and fundamental facts and issues which remain at the heart of the movement towards deregulation, restructuring and privatization in network industries in general and in the electricity industry in particular. We then proceed...

We model the interactions between management regimes (municipal vs. delegated) and operating costs of water supply services in order to compare their performance and pricing. We estimate the models from panel data in France. We show that the choice between management regimes at the local...

The analysis of organizational change and particularly of its impacts on incentives is neither simple nor easy. We consider here four contexts (choosing a level of decentralization, choosing the level of responsibility for pollution damage, choosing a level of technological or organisational...

This paper deals with the underlying factors explaining the stylized fact that Japan invests significantly more in flexible manufacturing technologies than the United States and Europe. We show how technological flexibility choices and equilibrium (both simultaneous and sequential)...

This paper makes some steps toward a formal political economy of environmental policy. Economists' quasi-unanimous preferences for sophisticated incentive regulation is reconsidered. First, we recast the question of instrument choice in the general mechanism literature and provide an incomplete...

We study the development of a duopoly industry -evolution of firm capacities and competitive behavior- in a continuous-time real-options model of capacity investment. Our methodology allows the evaluation of investment options and exercise rules in a strategic setup. In the initial industry...

We study a simple duopoly model of preemption with multiple investments and instantaneous Bertrand competition in a stochastically growing market. Different patterns of equilibria may arise, depending on the importance of the real option effect. If the average growth rate of the market is close...

As development proceeds, the demand for environmental protection increases. We study optimal investment decision rules when protection investments are irreversible and indivisible. We show that myopia (focusing on one particular outlay without considering investments that are to come later in...