Showing 1 - 10 of 26,597
In this theoretical analysis, the"principal"can be the head of the tax collection agency (or"government"or even citizens), the"supervisor"can be the tax collector, and the"agent"can be the taxpayer. The principal, interested in controlling an agent's socially costly activity ("cheating"), hires...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005129030
In an earlier paper, the authors presented a mathematical exposition of a theory that demonstrated that mass privatization without institutions to limit asset-stripping may not lead to a demand for the rule of law ["After the Big Bang? Obstacles to the Emergence of the Rule of Law in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005133451
The authors analyze the new Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) that was negotiated between a subset of General Agreement on Tariffs an Trade (GATT) members in the Uruguay Round, focusing especially on the expansion of coverage to services and on the strengthening of enforcement mechanisms....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005115787
The author presents measures with which to map institution building during the transition from centrally planned to market economies. Data collection and indicators are measured in terms of five institutional dimensions of governance: a) accountability; b) quality of the bureaucracy; c) rule of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005129022
Recent empirical research has focused on the role ofinstitutions in overall economic performance. This paper examines the impact of institutions on the relative performance of the service sector. Through cross-country level and growth regressions it establishes the following stylized fact:...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005129098
How does the lack of legitimacy of property rights affect the dynamics of the creation of the rule of law? The authors investigate the demand for the rule of law in post-communist economies after privatization under the assumption that theft is possible, that those who have"stolen"assets cannot...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005129107
Agency theory has had little to say about the control of bureaucratic corruption, perhaps the greatest agency problem that exists. The author considers the role of incentive contracting in reducing corruption through the use of independent investigations-a common way to monitor corruption. In...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005129207
Over the past few years, many studies have looked at the macroeconomic, cultural, and institutional determinants of corruption. This study complements these cross-country studies by focusing on microeconomic factors that affect bribes paid in a single sector of the economy. Using...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005134327
If bureaucratic burden and delay are exogenous, a firm may find bribes a helpful way to cut through red tape. According to the"efficient grease"hypothesis, corruption can improve economic efficiency, and,fighting bribery can be counterproductive. This need not be the case. In a general...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005116080
With the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union in 1989-91, many economic reformers supported"Big Bang"privatization-the rapid transfer of state-owned enterprises to private individuals. It was hoped that Big Bang privatization would create the conditions for a demand-led...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005128532