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BEST-RESPONSE DYNAMICS IN A BIRTH-DEATH MODEL OF EVOLUTION IN GAMES

ALÓS-FERRER, CARLOS; NEUSTADT, ILJA - In: International Game Theory Review (IGTR) 12 (2010) 02, pp. 197-204

We consider a model of evolution with mutations as in Kandori et al. (1993) [Kandori, M., Mailath, G.J., Rob, R., 1993 …. Learning, mutation, and long run equilibria in games. Econometrica 61, 29–56], where agents follow best-response decision rules … as in Sandholm (1998) [Sandholm, W., 1998. Simple and clever decision rules for a model of evolution. Economics Letters …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008725917

EVOLUTION AND THE COMPLEXITY OF FINITE AUTOMATA

KILANI, MOEZ - In: International Game Theory Review (IGTR) 09 (2007) 04, pp. 731-743

Prisoner's dilemma played by finite automata is reviewed again using a slightly modified measure of complexity. At a first step, an equilibrium with a large number of possible outcomes is shown to hold. At a second stage, we consider a game of repeated interaction, and show that on (limit)...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005081028

SKEW-SYMMETRY UNDER SIMULTANEOUS REVISIONS

NORMAN, TOM - In: International Game Theory Review (IGTR) 11 (2009) 04, pp. 471-478

Invariant selection of the risk-dominant equilibrium of evolutionary coordination games with "skew-symmetric" noise processes is extended to the case of simultaneous strategy revisions.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008475657

MANAGER, WORKER, RENTIER AND GOVERNMENT: MARKOV AND NON-MARKOVIAN PLAY

CORREA, ROMAR - In: International Game Theory Review (IGTR) 08 (2006) 03, pp. 429-436

We decompose the representative agent into her manager, worker and rentier selves. The criterion is the information set of each of the 'incarnations' at every stage of a repeated game. The rentier's information set includes anticipating information while the information set of the other agents...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005081030

REPUTATION BY IMITATION: AN EVOLUTIONARY MODEL WITH STRATEGIC MATCHING

VIGNOLO, THIERRY - In: International Game Theory Review (IGTR) 08 (2006) 03, pp. 417-428

This paper shows how strategic matching generates reputation-building behavior in an evolutionary chain-store game. Strategic matching means the possibility for an entrant to choose in a strategic way the local market into which it will move. Players are boundedly rational and follow behavioral...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005081031

A TIME-CONSISTENT AGREEMENT IN AN INTERREGIONAL DIFFERENTIAL GAME ON POLLUTION AND TRADE

CABO, FRANCISCO; ESCUDERO, ELENA; MARTÍN-HERRÁN, GUIOMAR - In: International Game Theory Review (IGTR) 08 (2006) 03, pp. 369-393

This paper studies a transboundary pollution problem between two neighbour regions as a dynamic game. These two regions do not only share an environmental problem but they are also engaged in interregional trade. A good produced in one region is traded to the other which uses it as an input....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005081032

EXPLORATION FOR NONRENEWABLE RESOURCES IN A DYNAMIC OLIGOPOLY: AN ARROVIAN RESULT

LAMBERTINI, LUCA - In: International Game Theory Review (IGTR) 16 (2014) 02, pp. 1440011-1

The model proposed in this paper investigates a differential Cournot oligopoly game with nonrenewable resource exploitation, in which each firm may exploit either its own private pool or a common pool jointly with the rivals. Firms use a deterministic technology to invest in exploration...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010757322

CONTAGION AND THE SPEED OF ADJUSTMENT IN SMALL WORLDS

CARTWRIGHT, EDWARD J. - In: International Game Theory Review (IGTR) 09 (2007) 04, pp. 689-704

We model a simple dynamic process in which myopic agents are matched amongst each other to play a coordination game. The network of player interaction is varied between a regular lattice and a random network allowing us to model contagion in small world networks. Weighting times for an...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005047556

SHELF-SPACE ALLOCATION AND ADVERTISING DECISIONS IN THE MARKETING CHANNEL: A DIFFERENTIAL GAME APPROACH

MARTÍN-HERRÁN, GUIOMAR; TABOUBI, SIHEM - In: International Game Theory Review (IGTR) 07 (2005) 03, pp. 313-330

This paper deals with the issue of shelf-space allocation and advertising decisions in marketing channels. We consider a network composed of a unique retailer offering the products of two competing manufacturers. The retailer controls the amount of shelf-space to allocate to both brands, while...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005047558

CORE CONCEPTS FOR DYNAMIC TU GAMES

KRANICH, LAURENCE; PEREA, ANDRÉS; PETERS, HANS - In: International Game Theory Review (IGTR) 07 (2005) 01, pp. 43-61

This paper is concerned with the question of how to define the core when cooperation takes place in a dynamic setting. The focus is on dynamic cooperative games in which the players face a finite sequence of exogenously specified TU-games. Three different core concepts are presented: the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005050933

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