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We study an all-pay contest with multiple identical prizes (lifeboat seats). Prizes are partitioned into subsets of … prizes (lifeboats). Players play a two-stage game. First, each player chooses an element of the partition (a lifeboat). Then …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010307685
We study an all-pay contest with multiple identical prizes (lifeboat seats). Prizes are partitioned into subsets of … prizes (lifeboats). Players play a two-stage game. First, each player chooses an element of the partition (a lifeboat). Then …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010271439
We study an all-pay contest with multiple identical prizes ("lifeboat seats"). Prizes are partitioned into subsets of … prizes ("lifeboats"). Players play a two-stage game. First, each player chooses an element of the partition ("a lifeboat …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010990355
We study an all-pay contest with multiple identical prizes (lifeboat seats). Prizes are partitioned into subsets of … prizes (lifeboats). Players play a two-stage game. First, each player chooses an element of the partition (a lifeboat). Then …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009397108
We study an all-pay contest with multiple identical prizes (“lifeboat seats”). Prizes are partitioned into subsets of … prizes (“lifeboats”). Players play a two-stage game. First, each player chooses an element of the partition (“a lifeboat …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011048563
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009657479
We study an all-pay contest with multiple identical prizes ("lifeboat seats"). Prizes are partitioned into subsets of … prizes ("lifeboats"). Players play a twostage game. First, each player chooses an element of the partition ("a lifeboat …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010633752
This paper reconsiders the comparison between hierarchical contests and single-stage contests. A condition is given that characterizes whether and when the aggregate equilibrium payoff of contestants is higher in the single-stage contest, and when the single-stage contest is more likely to award...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010307023
The symmetric two-player Hirshleifer (1989) contest is shown to admit a unique equilibrium. The support of the equilibrium strategy is finite and includes, in particular, the zero expenditure level. We also establish a lower bound for the cardinality of the support and an upper bound for the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011969197
We characterize the equilibrium set of the n-player Hirshleifer contest with homogeneous valuations. A symmetric equilibrium always exists. It necessarily corresponds to multilateral peace for sufficient noise and uses finite-support randomized strategies otherwise. Asymmetric equilibria are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012284783