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Certification as a Viable Quality Assurance Mechanism: Theory and Suggestive Evidence
Svitkova, Katarina; Ortmann, Andreas - Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education and … - 2006
particular solution of this problem, certification, where an independent agency provides a costly signal, a certificate, to … nonprofit. The assumptions of our model are derived from stylized facts that we distilled from certification systems currently … literature on certification and provides results that are different from those reported up to now. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005357507
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Certification as a Viable Quality Assurance Mechanism in Transition Economies: Evidence, Theory, and Open Questions
Ortmann, Andreas; Svítková, Katarína - In: Prague Economic Papers 2007 (2007) 2, pp. 99-114
the state, and that relies on the market only indirectly: Certification agencies force their members to reveal their (good …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005036542
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Renegotiation of Sales Contracts
Matthews, Steven A. - 1993
Contracts adopted with later renegotiation in mind may take simple forms. In a principal-agent model, if renegotiation may occur after the agent chooses efforet, the principal protects against unfavorable renegotiation by "selling the project" to the agent via a sales contract. If only singleton...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012235864
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Renegotiation of Sales Contracts
Matthews, Steven A. - Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and … - 1993
Contracts adopted with later renegotiation in mind may take simple forms. In a principal-agent model, if renegotiation may occur after the agent chooses efforet, the principal protects against unfavorable renegotiation by "selling the project" to the agent via a sales contract. If only singleton...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005766727
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Renegotiation of Sales Contracts under Moral Hazard
Matthews, Steven A. - Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and … - 1991
Sales contracts emerge when a principal and an agent in amoral hazard environment cannot prevent themselves from renegotiating their contract. The renegotiation occurs after the agent chooses his unobservable effort, but before its consequences are realized. Unlike previous analyses, a contract...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005766769
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Prompted to Be Good : The Impact of Certification on the Quality of Charities
Svitkova, Katarina - 2008
In this study we model how certification affects managers' choice of the quality of the nonprofit organizations they … charitable good, one donor, and a certification agency. We assume that the nature of the charitable good does not allow for …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014219236
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Communication in Cournot oligopoly
Goltsman, Maria; Pavlov, Gregory - 2012
We study communication in a static Cournot duopoly model under the assumption that the firms have unverifiable private information about their costs. We show that cheap talk between the firms cannot transmit any information. However, if the firms can communicate through a third party,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010292012
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Testing a forgotten aspect of Akerlof's gift exchange hypothesis: Relational contracts with individual and uniform wages
Kocher, Martin G.; Luhan, Wolfgang J.; Sutter, Matthias - 2012
Empirical work on Akerlof's theory of gift exchange in labor markets has concentrated on the fair wage-effort hypothesis. In fact, however, the theory also contains a social component that stipulates that homogenous agents that are employed for the same wage level will exert more effort,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010294837
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Managers and Students Playing Cournot: Experimental Evidence from Malaysia
Waichman, Israel; Requate, Till; Siang, Ch'ng Kean - 2008
We report results from a Cournot triopoly experiment with different subject pools: German students, Malaysian students, and Malaysian managers. While German students play Nash, we reject the hypothesis that both Malaysian students and managers select the Nash quantity. Moreover, Malaysian...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010298767
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Pre-play communication in Cournot competition: An experiment with students and managers
Waichman, Israel; Requate, Till; Siang, Ch'ng Kean - 2010
This study investigates the impact of pre-play communication on the outcomes in Cournot duopoly and triopoly experiments, using both students and managers as subjects. Communication is implemented by two different devices, a 'standardized-communication' and a free-communication device. We find...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010302699