This paper is based on a two-stage model of an incumbent firm and a potential entrant. We consider two cases in terms of strategic relevance between both firms. We also consider both price-setting competition and quantitysetting competition. Therefore, we examine four cases. Each case is...

The analysis in Fudenberg and Tirole (1983) discusses the perfect equilibria of a continuous-time model of the strategic investment decisions of two profitmaximizing private firms in a new market and suggests that there are perfect equilibria where each firm does not invest to its steady-state...

This paper examines a two-period mixed market model in which a welfaremaximizing public firm and a profit-maximizing private firm can use inventory investment as a strategic device. It is then demonstrated that the equilibrium in the second period coincides with the Stackelberg solution where...

We examine the behaviors of one state-owned welfare-maximizing firm and one labor-managed income-per-worker-maximizing firm in a two-stage mixed market model with capacity investment as a strategic instrument. In the first stage, each firm independently decides whether or not to install...

This paper examines the idea that if an incumbent firm deviates from short-term profit maximization behavior and deters the entry of a potential entrant at the expense of higher profit, then its own mid-/long-term profit maximization is achieved. The paper confirms the importance of the...

We consider an observer who makes a finite number of observations of an industry producing a homogeneous good, where each observation consists of the market price and firm specific production quantities.  We develop a revealed preference test (in the form of a linear program) for the hypothesis...

This study investigates the impact of pre-play communication on the outcomes in Cournot duopoly and triopoly experiments, using both students and managers as subjects. Communication is implemented by two different devices, a 'standardized-communication' and a free-communication device. We find...

Cooperation in prisoner's dilemma games can usually be sustained only if the game has an infinite horizon. We analyze to what extent the theoretically crucial distinction of finite vs. infinite-horizon games is reflected in the outcomes of a prisoner's dilemma experiment. We compare three...

In this paper we apply the complete analysis of a differentiable game (recently introduced by the author) to determine possible suitable behaviors (actions) of tourism firms during strategic interactions with other tourism firms, from both non-cooperative and cooperative point of view. To...

This paper models the organization of the firm as a type of artificial neural network in a duopoly setting. The firm plays a repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma type game, and must also learn to map environmental signals to demand parameters and to its rival’s willingness to cooperate. We study the...