We survey the main results on strategic information transmission, which is often referred to as ``persuasion" when types are verifiable and as ``cheap talk" when they are not. In the simplest ``cheap talk'' model, an informed player sends a single message to a receiver who makes a decision. The...

This paper characterizes geometrically the set of all Nash equilibrium payoffs achievable with unmediated communication in persuasion games, i.e., games with an informed expert and an uninformed decisionmaker in which the expert's information is certifiable. The first equilibrium...

This paper develops and compares two theories of strategic behavior of professional forecasters. The first theory posits that forecasters compete in a forecasting contest with pre-specified rules. In equilibrium of a winner-take-all contest, forecasts are excessively differentiated. According to...

We examine the possibilities for communication between agents with divergent preferences in a noisy environment. Taking Crawford and Sobel’s [4] (noiseless) communication game as a reference point, we study a model in which there is a probability e ? (0, 1) that the received message is a...

This paper develops an approach to equilibrium selection in game theory based on studying the equilibriating process through which equilibrium is achieved. The differential equations derived from models of interactive learning typically have stationary states that are not isolated. Instead, Nash...

This paper studies the effects of pre-play communication on equilibrium selection in 2x2 symmetric coordination games. The players repeatedly play a coordination game preceded by an opportunity to exchange payoff irrelevant messages and gradually adjust their behavior. In short run, the players'...

Nous présentons une synthèse des principaux modèles de transmission stratégique de l'information. Dans une première partie, nous étudions les jeux dits de "cheap-talk", c'est-à-dire les jeux de communication directe dans lesquels les messages sont gratuits et non vérifiables. Nous...

In this paper we study, within a formal model, market environments where information is costly to acquire and is of use also to potential competitors. Agents may then sell, or buy, reports over the information acquired and choose the trades in the market on the basis of what they learnt. Reports...

In this paper we study market environments where information is costly to acquire and is also useful to potential competitors. Agents may sell, or buy, reports over the information acquired and choose their trades in the market on the basis of what they learnt. Reports are unverifiable – cheap...

We present a model in which the media endorses the character of office-seeking candidates as a means to promote its own ideological agenda. In equilibrium, political parties completely pander to the elite-controlled media under moderate ideological conflict between voters and the elite. Larger...