The paper compares the trading costs for institutional investors who are subject to liquidity shocks, of trading in auction and dealer markets. The batch auction restricts the institutions’ ability to exploit informational advantages because of competition between institutions when they...

In this paper we explore the role of conflict as an informational device by means of a simple bargaining model with one-sided incomplete information: Limited conflicts reveal information about the outcome of the all-out conflict (that ends the game) because the outcomes of both types of...

This paper analyses a model in which .rms cannot pay discriminate based on year of entry to a .rm, and develops an equilibrium model of wage dynamics and unemployment. The model is developed under the assumption of worker mobility, so that workers can costlessly quit jobs at any time. Firms on...

The paper models the boundaries of the multinational firm by looking at a simple trade-off between FDI (internal expansion with strong control rights) and debt (arm’s length expansion with loose control rights) in the context of contractual incompleteness due to institutional constraints in...

Research finds that firms' investment decisions are distorted by irreversibility and finance constraints. Whereas the existing literature examines the exects of these features separately, this paper studies their interaction. The impact of these constraints on a firm's incentive to invest is...

Research finds that firms' investment and dividend policies are distorted by irreversibility and finance constraints. Whereas the existing literature examines these features separately, this paper considers their interaction. The main theoretical result concerns the separation of the investment...

Aggregated (S;s) models purport to provide a structural, microfounded and statistically robust explanation of aggregate investment uctuations. In this paper I analyse these claims, present several empirical puzzles arising from the model and discuss hoe the model might be extended to account for...

Under oligopoly firms are often observed to specialise their production, with some firms producing highly reliable output and offering good warranty deals, while others produce less reliable output and offer less attractive warranties, but charge a lower price. This paper develops an approach to...

Society often allocates valuable resources - such as prestigious positions, salaries, or marriage partners - via tournament-like institutions. In such situations, inequality affects incentives to compete and hence has a direct effect on equilibrium choices and hence material outcomes. We...

This paper analyzes coalition formation in a model of contests with linear costs. Agents first form groups and then compete by investing resources. Coalitions fight for prizes that are assumed to be subject to rivalry, so their value is non-increasing in the size of the group. This formulation...