-contractible up-front investments to improve their bargaining position and gain advantage for possible future conflict. Bargaining is … player winning in Conflict is higher than the share received under Nash bargaining. We thus provide a rationale for conflict … efficient ex post, but we show that a player may prefer Conflict ex ante if there are sufficient asymmetries in strength. There …

-contractible up-front investments to improve their bargaining position and gain advantage for possible future conflict. Bargaining is … player winning in Conflict is higher than the share received under Nash bargaining. We thus provide a rationale for conflict … efficient ex post, but we show that a player may prefer Conflict ex ante if there are sufficient asymmetries in strength. There …

Envy is often the cause of mutually harmful outcomes. We experimentally study the impact of envy in a bargaining … setting in which there is no conflict in material interests: a proposer, holding the role of residual claimant, chooses the … harms the proposer. Notwithstanding, maximal claims by proposers are predominant for all game types. This generates conflict …

Envy is often the cause of mutually harmful outcomes. We experimentally study the impact of envy in a bargaining … setting in which there is no conflict in material interests: a proposer, holding the role of residual claimant, chooses the … harms the proposer. Notwithstanding, maximal claims by proposers are predominant for all game types. This generates conflict …

This paper studies a simple two-stage model of conflict in which two players allocate resources between arms and …

Envy is often the cause of mutually harmful outcomes. We experimentally study the impact of envy in a bargaining … setting in which there is no conflict in material interests: a proposer, holding the role of residual claimant, chooses the … harms the proposer. Notwithstanding, maximal claims by proposers are predominant for all game types. This generates conflict …

bargaining power. We show that negligibly small changes in the bargaining power of non-elites, conditional on enfranchisment, via … coalition formation, constrains the bargaining power of the stronger elite and result in discontinuous changes in equilibrium …