agents who are uncertain about each other's fighting potential. We model the default option of outright conflict as a … probabilistic contest. Examples of such contests may be international conflict, litigation, and elections. We show, in particular …, that if the loss of surplus from outright conflict is small enough, then any mechanism must assign a positive probability …

potential. Applications include international conflict, litigation, and elections. Even though only a peaceful agreement avoids … a loss of resources, if this loss is small enough, then any mechanism must assign a positive probability of conflict. We … show how the likelihood of conflict outbreak depends on the distribution of power between the agents and their information …

potential. Applications include international conflict, litigation, and elections. Even though only a peaceful agreement avoids … a loss of resources, if this loss is small enough, then any contract must assign a positive probability of conflict. We … show how the likelihood of conflict outbreak depends on the distribution of power between the agents and their information …

commitment of donors must not be in doubt. For these conditions to be in place, conflict resolution must be in donors' interests …

power. When parties are risk-averse, a self-enforcing peace agreement may not be feasible. The bargaining power of the …

This paper studies bargaining and conflict under incomplete information, provides an overview and a critical account of … sequential bargaining that take confrontation as final. Conflict and inefficiencies are to be expected in these models whenever … parties have optimistic prospects on the outcome of the all-out conflict. After examining the causes and reasons for this …

been thought of as a substitute to pretrial bargaining and litigation, in fact, parties may be able to reach a settlement … bargaining. We develop a theoretical model of pre-arbitration bargaining that is able to identify the impact of the institutional … the composition of the panel of arbitrators allows us to illustrate its effect on bargaining. We show that the number of …