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This article displays a study on the mutual insurance of bank deposits. A system where deposits are first insured by a consortium then by the Government is envisaged. We wish to compute the fair premia due to both the consortium and the Government. Various types of covenants aiming at making...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005722857
This note provides an example of an optimal banking panic. We construct a model in which a banking panic is triggered by the banker, not the depositors. When the banker receives a pessimistic information on the return on the bank’s assets, he liquidates them prematurely in order to protect his...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005722877
In this paper I ask whether a central bank policy of providing liquidity to banks during panics can prevent bank runs without causing moral hazard. This kind of policy has been widely advocated, most notably by Bagehot (1873). To analyze such a policy, I build a model with three key features: 1)...
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Recent evidence suggests that bank regulators appear to be able to resolve insolvent large banks efficiently without either protecting uninsured deposits through invoking "too-big-to-fail" or causing serious harm to other banks or financial markets. But resolving swap positions at insolvent...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005726268
An important question is whether the financial safety net reduces market discipline on bank risk taking. For countries with varying deposit insurance schemes, we find that deposit rates continue to reflect bank riskiness. Cross-country evidence suggests that explicit deposit insurance reduces...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661598
Hooks and Robinson (2002) argue that deposit insurance in Texas during the 1920s induced banks to invest in riskier assets. Their regressions indicate that this manifestation of moral hazard may explain some of what happened, but not all. Some other mechanism, hitherto overlooked, must also have...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008484319