This paper analyzes optimal pricing for information goods underincomplete information, when both unlimited-usage (fixed-fee) pricingand usage-based pricing are feasible and administering usage-basedpricing may involve transaction costs. It is shown that offeringfixed-fee pricing in addition to a...

This paper analyzes optimal monopoly pricing under incompleteinformation for a good that displays positive network effects. Incontrast with standard models of network effects (Katz and Shapiro,1985), the good modeled in this paper is consumed in variable quantitiesby heterogeneous customers, and...

Electronic commerce has enabled the use of intelligent agenttechnologies that can evaluate buyers, customize products, and price inreal-time. Our model of an electronic market with customizable productsanalyzes the pricing, profitability and welfare implications ofagent-based technologies that...

We present a framework for measuring software quality using pricing anddemand data, and empirical estimates that quantify the extent of qualitydegradation associated with software ver- sioning. Using a 7-month,108-product panel of software sales from Amazon.com, we document theextent to which...

We develop and analyze a model of pricing for digital products withdiscontinuous supply functions. This characterizes a number ofinformation technology-based products and services for which variableincreases in demand are fulfilled by the addition of 'blocks' ofcomputing or network...

As Internet-based commerce becomes increasingly widespread, large data sets about the demand for and pricing of a wide variety of products become available. These present exciting new opportunities for empirical economic and business research, but also raise new statistical issues and...

We study how firm boundaries are affected by the reduction in search costs when business-to-business electronic markets are adopted. Our paper analyzes a multi-tier industry in which upstream parts suppliers incur procurement search costs, and downstream manufacturers incur incentive contracting...