This paper studies the design of a recommender system for organizing social learning on a product. To improve incentives for early experimentation, the optimal design trades off fully transparent social learning by over-recommending a product (or “spamming”) to a fraction of agents in the...

We consider inference on optimal treatment assignments. Our methods allow for inference on the treatment assignment rule that would be optimal given knowledge of the population treatment effect in a general setting. The procedure uses multiple hypothesis testing methods to determine a subset of...

We investigate why people keep their promises in the absence of external enforcement mechanisms and reputational effects. In a controlled laboratory experiment we show that exogenous variation of second-order expectations (promisors' expectations about promisees' expectations that the promise...

We consider the impact of Tax credits and income support programs on female education choice, employment, hours and human capital accumulation over the life-cycle. We thus analyze both the short run incentive effects and the longer run implications of such programs. By allowing for risk aversion...

We estimate a dynamic model of employment, human capital accumulation — including education, and savings for women in the UK, exploiting policy changes. We analyze both the incentive effects and the welfare implications of tax credits and income support programs and we account for their...

It is often argued that informal labor markets in developing countries promote growth by reducing the impact of regulation. On the other hand informality may reduce the amount of social protection offered to workers. We extend the wage-posting framework of Burdett and Mortensen (1998) to allow...

A game of incomplete information can be decomposed into a basic game and an information structure. The basic game defines the set of actions, the set of payoff states the payoff functions and the common prior over the payoff states. The information structure refers to the signals that the...

We calibrate a sequence of four nested models to study the dynamics of wealth accumulation. Individuals maximize a utility function whose arguments are consumption and investment. They desire to accumulate wealth for its own sake — this is not a life-cycle model. A competitive firm produces a...

In models defined by unconditional moment restrictions, specification tests are possible and estimators can be ranked in terms of efficiency whenever the number of moment restrictions exceeds the number of parameters. We show that a similar relationship between potential refutability of a model...

We examine a repeated interaction between an agent, who undertakes experiments, and a principal who provides the requisite funding for these experiments. The repeated interaction gives rise to a dynamic agency cost—the more lucrative is the agent’s stream of future rents following a failure,...