strong simple game G if the voting power of each individual, measured by the it Shapley-Shubik power index, is sufficiently … monotone strong simple games if and only if the maximum voting power for all individuals tends to zero. …

group of agents. Fairness requires that each agent weakly prefers his consumption bundle to any other agent's bundle. In … this context, fairness is incompatible with budget-balance and non-manipulability (Green and Laffont, 1979). Our approach …

In this paper we address several issues related to collective dichotomous decision-making by means of quaternary voting … rules, i.e., when voters may choose between four actions: voting yes, voting no, abstaining and not turning up-which are … aggregated by a voting rule into a dichotomous decision: acceptance or rejection of a proposal. In particular we study the links …

Weighted committees allow shareholders, party leaders, etc. to wield different numbers of votes or voting weights as …

Voting Power Indices enable the analysis of the distribution of power in a legislature or voting body which uses … weighted voting. Although the approach, based on co-operative game theory, has been known for a long time it has not been very …

Voting Power Indices enable the analysis of the distribution of power in a legislature or voting body in which …

Power indices have been used to evaluate the allocation of power in a wide range of voting situations. While they use … the language of game theory known measures of a priori voting power are hardly more than statistical expectations assuming …, rejected coalitions, a priori voting power, power indices, minimal winning coalitions, rational players. …