Financial safety nets in Asia have come a long way since the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) of 1997/98. Not wanting to rely solely on the International Monetary Fund (IMF) again, the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) was created in 2000. When the CMI also proved inadequate following the Global Financial...

It is not easy to untangle the logic that in the past led to creation of the European Monetary Union (EMU) and that is currently guiding the prevailing Eurozone (EZ) policies. Although lacking the right institutions, which can be seen as the ultimate root of its crisis, the ten years of the EMU...

This paper explores the economic rationale of an EMU fiscal capacity. It explains that the EMU's architecture suffers from two structural weaknesses: a tendency to develop imbalances and an inherent deflationary bias. The analysis shows that the external imbalances developed during the first...

There is a perception that IMF programmes are not catalytic and instead associated with large capital outflows, higher refinancing costs for sovereigns and adverse movements in stock markets. This has led to concerns that an expectation of adverse effects of IMF programmes may deter countries...

This paper critically reviews the theoretical basis for the provision of the global financial safety net (GFSN) and provides a comprehensive database covering four elements of the GFSN (foreign exchange reserves, IMF financing, central bank swap lines and regional financing arrangements) for...

Using empirical analysis, complemented with case studies, this paper studies under which circumstances IMF programs manage to catalyze private capital flows into the countries concerned. While we found no catalysis in general, the situation differs very much depending on the type of capital flow...

In 1998, following some 10 years of structural reforms that began during the late Soviet era under the Perestroika processes and continued after the collapse of the USSR, Russia has recorded its first year of economic growth. Then, with virtually no advanced warning, by the of August 1998,...

From the Irish perspective, the impact of debt overhang on long-term growth in the advanced economies presents a clear warning. Ireland's debt overhang is outright extreme. Across the 18 advanced economies, weighted average real economic debts stood at 307% of GDP at the end of 2010 and are...

This paper presents a model to explain how IMF programmes can catalyse private capital flows following a financial crisis, a concept that was at the heart of the IMF's strategy for dealing with capital account crises in the late 1990s. In the model, the IMF lends funds below the prevailing...

Previous tests of creditor moral hazard cannot distinguish between two types of investor behavior: expectations of implicit guarantees or better future economic fundamentals due to a prospective IMF program. The novelty of our approach lies in the inclusion of the forward foreign exchange rate...