In online auction platforms, offers are listed side by side and may end at the same point in time. While theoretical studies predict efficient coordination across auctions, experimental and empirical studies observe efficiency losses, i.e. goods remain unsold. In order to mitigate this...

Previous experimental and empirical evidence has identified social preferences in the voluntary provision of public goods. A number of competing models of such preferences have been proposed. We provide evidence for one model of behavior in these games, reciprocity (or matching, or conditional...

Ascending price clock auctions with drop-out information typically yield outcomes closer to equilibrium predictions than do comparable sealed-bid auctions. However clock auctions require congregating all bidders for a fixed time interval, which has limited field applicability and introduces...

Edgeworth exchange is the fundamental general equilibrium model, yet equilibrium predications and theories of price adjustment for this model remain untested. This paper reports an experimental test of Edgeworth exchange which demonstrates that prices and allocations converge sharply to the...

Similar to Levati and Neugebauer (2001), a clock is used by which participants can vary their individual contributions for voluntarily providing a public good. As time goes by, participants either in(de)crease their contribution gradually or keep it constant. Groups of two poorly and two richly...

We examine demand behaviour for intertemporal dependencies, using Spanishpanel data. We present evidence that there is both state dependence and correlatedheterogeneity in demand behaviour. Our specific findings are that food outside thehome, alcohol and tobacco are habit forming whereas...

This paper proposes a methodology to implement probabilistic belief elicitation in continuous-choice games. Representing subjective probabilistic beliefs about a continuous variable as a continuous subjective probability distribution, the methodology involves eliciting partial information about...