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A robust nding of repeated public goods experiments is that high initialcontribution rates sharply decline towards the end. This paper reports onan exploratory experiment designed to discover whether such a decline is simply triggered by the usual experimental practice of publicly informing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866812
Idiosyncratic risk attitudes are usually assumed to be commonly known and restricted to own payoffs. However, the alternatives faced by a decision maker often involve risks for others' payoffs as well. Motivated by the importance of other-regarding preferences in social interactions, this paper...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005765150
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005307435
A robust finding of repeated public goods experiments is that high initial contribution rates sharply decline towards the end. This paper reports on an exploratory experiment designed to discover whether such a decline is simply triggered by the usual experimental practice of publicly informing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005252208
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005188342
A procurement contract is granted by a bureaucrat (the auctioneer) who is interested in a low price and a bribe from the provider. The optimal bids and bribes are derived based on an iid private cost assumption. In the experiment, bribes are negatively framed (betweensubjects treatment) to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005786053
We enrich the choice task of responders in ultimatum games by allow- ing them to independently decide whether to collect what is offered to them and whether to destroy what the proposer demanded. Such a multidimensional response format intends to cast further light on the motives guiding...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010887074
We investigate experimentally whether collective choice matters for individual attitudes to ambiguity. We consider a two-urn Ellsberg experiment: one urn offers a 45% chance of winning a fixed monetary prize, the other an ambiguous chance. Participants choose either individually or in groups of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010887075
In the hybrid game, one proposer confronts two responders with veto power: one responder can condition his decisions on his own offer but the other cannot. We vary what the informed responder knows about the offers as well as the uninformed responder's conflict payoff. Neither variation affects...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010779440
This paper derives and justifies a procedurally fair bidding mechanism and reviews experiments that apply the mechanism to public projects pro- vision. In the experiments, not all parties benefit from provision, and the projects' costs can be negative. The experimental results indicate that the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010884460