We experimentally investigate four allocation mechanisms - all based on the fair division approach, with varying bid … elicitation methods and price rules - in terms of their allocation efficiency, distributional effects, and regularities in … the same time, exerts negative externalities on the non-acquiring bidders. Both the bidders'; valuations of the good and …

. -- Allocation ; auction ; fair division ; externalities ; experiment …We experimentally investigate four allocation mechanisms - all based on the fair division approach, with varying bid … elicitation methods and price rules - in terms of their allocation efficiency, distributional effects, and regularities in …

used routinely by numerous firms. Considerable research has been conducted to ascertain auction formats that generate the …), efficient and satisfies the Revenue-Equivalence principle, under no externalities. Additionally, in the set of efficient, IC …

paid by the winner. We study the impact of these price-externalities on the first-price auction and the second … independently from the identity of the winner. We prove that the first-price auction is not affected by this kind of price-externalities … by the presence of such price-externalities. In any case, in comparison with the first-price auction, the second …

bids become due. It is shown that when bidders experience identity dependent externalities and auction participation is … auction allocation in a more ex-post efficient manner. Furthermore, it is shown that the policy of revelation increases both … exogenous, then for a large class of standard auction mechanisms, a policy of revelation serves to realize a higher surplus …

(2002)'s package auction that posesses an efficient Nash equilibrium in pure strategies leading to a core allocation. No …Auctions can lead to efficient allocations in a wide class of assignment problems. In the presence of externalities …, however, efficiency may no longer be guaranteed. This paper develops an ascending price auction based on Ausubel & Milgrom …

In auctions with externalities, it is well-known that the core can be empty, which is undesirable both in terms of … stability and fairness. Nevertheless, some auction outcome must be chosen. We separate deviations into two types: deviations by …

In auctions with externalities, the core can be empty, which is undesirable both in terms of stability and fairness. We …

We analyze optimal auction design in the presence of negative externalities. We assume that externalities are a … mechanism when externalities are quot;strongly decreasingquot;, quot;weakly decreasingquot; and quot;increasingquot; in the …

not to participate. Specifically, I assume that externalities enter in the cost function of the nonparticipating … landholders. I show that, in the case of negative externalities, the government will implement a transfer function which is …