We experimentally investigate four allocation mechanisms - all based on the fair division approach, with varying bid … elicitation methods and price rules - in terms of their allocation efficiency, distributional effects, and regularities in … the same time, exerts negative externalities on the non-acquiring bidders. Both the bidders'; valuations of the good and …

. -- Allocation ; auction ; fair division ; externalities ; experiment …We experimentally investigate four allocation mechanisms - all based on the fair division approach, with varying bid … elicitation methods and price rules - in terms of their allocation efficiency, distributional effects, and regularities in …

used routinely by numerous firms. Considerable research has been conducted to ascertain auction formats that generate the …), efficient and satisfies the Revenue-Equivalence principle, under no externalities. Additionally, in the set of efficient, IC …

paid by the winner. We study the impact of these price-externalities on the first-price auction and the second … independently from the identity of the winner. We prove that the first-price auction is not affected by this kind of price-externalities … by the presence of such price-externalities. In any case, in comparison with the first-price auction, the second …

We conduct laboratory experiments for the Vickrey auction with and without an announcement on strategy-proofness to … the announcement. Moreover, by conducting experiments for the pay-your-bid auction, which is not strategy-proof, with and …

bids become due. It is shown that when bidders experience identity dependent externalities and auction participation is … auction allocation in a more ex-post efficient manner. Furthermore, it is shown that the policy of revelation increases both … exogenous, then for a large class of standard auction mechanisms, a policy of revelation serves to realize a higher surplus …

paid by the winner. We study the impact of these price-externalities on the first-price auction and the second … independently from the identity of the winner. We prove that the first-price auction is not affected by this kind of price-externalities … by the presence of such price-externalities. In any case, in comparison with the first-price auction, the second …

paid by the winner. We study the impact of these price-externalities on the first-price auction and the second … independently from the identity of the winner. We prove that the first-price auction is not affected by this kind of price-externalities … by the presence of such price-externalities. In any case, in comparison with the first-price auction, the second …

identity-independent price externalities, while the outcome of the second-price auction is. In contrast, identity …-dependent price externalities affect the outcome of both auction formats. In any case, the second-price auction exacerbates the …We consider an auction setting, in a symmetric information framework, in which bidders, even if they fail to obtain the …

identity-independent price externalities, while the outcome of the second-price auction is. In contrast, identity …-dependent price externalities affect the outcome of both auction formats. In any case, the second-price auction exacerbates the …We consider an auction setting, in a symmetric information framework, in which bidders, even if they fail to obtain the …