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Multi-unit ascending auctions allow for equilibria in which bidders strategically reduce their demand and split the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011342575
This paper empirically evaluates two possible sources of large takeover premiums: pre-emptive bidding and target resistance. We develop an auction model that features costly sequential entry of bidders in takeover contests and that encompasses both explanations. We estimate the model parameters...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010680449
We evaluate empirically two sources of large takeover premiums: preemptive bidding and target resistance. We develop an auction model that features costly sequential entry of bidders in takeover contests and encompasses both explanations. We estimate the model parameters by simulated method of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011076293
Many auctions are followed by a resale market which occurs when the winner of the auction resells the item won to one …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010594585
Many auctions are followed by a resale market which occurs when the winner of the auction resells the item won to one …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008645080
The theoretical literature on collusion in auctions suggests that the first-price mechanism can deter the formation of … likely to affect the bidding behavior in first-price (but not second-price) auctions. We test experimentally a setup in which … collusion in first-price and second-price auctions. Furthermore, failed collusion attempts distort the bidding behavior in the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010472820
If a government auctions the right to market a good, continuity is likely to be of significant importance. In a … laboratory experiment, we compare the effects of bidders' limited liability in the first-price sealed-bid auction and the English …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011383054
activities. We use an economic experiment to examine whether the market efficiency of conservation auctions increases or … decreases with repetition. Theory predicts that repetition facilitates collusion among sellers in procurement auctions, while … effects, the latter has the upper hand; average bids decrease monotonically over the consecutive auctions. Since repetition …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011932593
We show that it is beneficial for a buyer to conduct a multi-stage mechanism if bidders are loss averse. In a first step, we derive a revenue equivalence principle. Fixing the multi-stage structure, the revenue is independent of the chosen payment rule. Secondly, we introduce a simple two-stage...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012146346
confirm these hypotheses in the experiment. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012150752