Showing 541 - 550 of 609
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005794226
This paper studies the costs and benefits of delegating decisions to superiorly informed agents relative to the use of rigid, non discretionary contracts. Delegation grants some flexibility in the choice of the action by the agent, but also requires the use of an appropriate incentive contract...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008518901
When individuals' labor and capital income are subject to uninsurable idiosyncratic risks, should capital and labor be taxed, and if so how? In a two period general equilibrium model with production, we derive a decomposition formula of the welfare effects of these taxes into insurance and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008493360
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008468940
This paper studies the costs and benefits of delegating decisions to superiorly informed agents relative to the use of rigid, non discretionary contracts. Delegation grants some flexibility in the choice of the action by the agent, but also requires the use of an appropriate incentive contract...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008531633
This paper studies the costs and benefits of delegating decisions to superiorly informed agents relative to the use of rigid, non discretionary contracts. Delegation grants some flexibility in the choice of the action by the agent, but also requires the use of an appropriate incentive contract...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008533994
In this paper we provide a characterization of the welfare properties of rational expectations equilibria of economies in which, prior to trading, agents have some information over the realization of uncertainty. We study a model with asymmetrically informed agents, treating symmetric...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136439
In this paper we provide a characterization of the welfare properties of rational expectations equilibria of economies in which, prior to trading, agents have some information over the realization of uncertainity. We study a model with asymmetrically informed agents, treating symmetric...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005073760
We examine the possibility of a Pareto-improving pay-as-you-go social security system, using an ex-ante welfare criterion. Our objective is to identify the conditions under which a suitably designed pay-as-you-go social security system is welfare improving, when markets are complete and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005090885
In this paper we identify conditions under which the introduction of a pay-as-you-go social security system is ex-ante Pareto-improving in a stochastic overlapping generations economy with capital accumulation and land. We argue that these conditions are consistent with many calibrations of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005094502