This paper studies competitive equilibria in economies characterized by the presence of asymmetric information, where non-exclusive contracts with payoffs dependent on the agents' private information are traded on competitive markets. For such economies competitive equilibria may not exist with...

The article is concerned with understanding the impact of social preferences and wealth inequality on aggregate economic outcomes. We investigate how different manifestations of other-regarding preferences affect incentive contracts at the microeconomic level and how these in turn translate into...

The article is concerned with understanding the impact of social preferences and wealth inequality on aggregate economic outcomes. We investigate how different manifestations of other-regarding preferences affect incentive contracts at the microeconomic level and how these in turn translate into...

This paper extends the dynamic Mirrlees model to general equilibrium and derives the optimal social insurance policies against persistent idiosyncratic risk over the life cycle. Agents are heterogeneous in their work ability, which is private information and evolves stochastically over time, and...

In general screening problems, implementable allocation rules correspond exactly to Walrasian equilibria of an economy in which types are consumers with quasilinear utility and unit demand. Due to the welfare theorems, an allocation rule is implementable if and only if it induces an efficient...

We study an overlapping generations version of the principal-agent problem, where incentive contracts are determined in general equilibrium. All individuals are workers when young, but have a choice between becoming entrepreneurs or remaining workers when old. Imperfections in the credit market...

We study an overlapping generations version of the principal-agent problem, where incentive contracts are determined in general equilibrium. All individuals are workers when young, but have a choice between becoming entrepreneurs or remaining workers when old. Imperfections in the credit market...

In a fundamental contribution, Prescott and Townsend (1984) [PT] have shown that the existence and efficiency properties of Walrasian equilibria extend to economies with moral hazard, when agents' trades are observable (exclusive contracts can be implemented). More recently, Bennardo and...

Asymmetric information concerns either commodities or mutually exclusive states of the world. The notion of competitive equilibrium differs between the two cases. In particular, incentive compatibility constraints are only relevant in the case of asymmetric information concerning mutually...