monitoring is costly governance is imperfect. If managerial hedging is detected, shareholders can seize the payoffs of the … poorly, (ii) the more costly monitoring is, the more sensitive is the manager's compensation to firm performance, and (iii … revealed by monitoring. …

provide excessive incentives to signal that their firms are well-governed. Moreover, to avoid investor criticism, certain …

. However, recent evidence suggests that high-powered incentives also provide managers with incentives to manipulate the firm … firm hierarchy — division managers and Chief Financial Officers — are likely to have similar incentives, and perhaps even …, previous research focuses on equity incentives and largely ignores other elements of incentive pay. We contribute to this …

monitoring is costly governance is imperfect. If managerial hedging is detected, shareholders can seize the payoffs of the … poorly, (ii) the more costly monitoring is, the more sensitive is the manager’s compensation to firm performance, and (iii … revealed by monitoring. …