performance, lower risk-taking incentives, and the fact that some CEOs would be better off with a restriction than without it … risk-taking incentives, restrictions on incentive pay (stock and options) result in higher risk-taking incentives …

alignment, and the psychology of incentives, and have numerous unintended consequences that are value-destructive particularly …

the monitoring services of the boards; better monitoring increases the chance of finding the current executives' true … quality and of replacing underperforming executives; better monitoring can also decrease total pay by reducing information … independent the compensation committee, the higher the CEO pay slice (CPS). The increased CPS results from both incentives and …

their impact varying with their independence and relative magnitude of ownership. Monitoring blockholders increase the …). Finally, consistent with them affording less effective monitoring, larger boards raise (lower) the sensitivity of known pay …

effects between governance strength and equity incentives. As further evidence consistent with the managerial power view, we …