We formulate and study a general finite-horizon bargaining game with simultaneous moves and a disagreement outcome that need not be the worst possible result for the agents. Conditions are identified under which the game is dominance solvable in the sense that iterative deletion of weakly...

The capital management problem posed by R. H. Strotz is analyzed for the case of the "naive" planner who fails to anticipate changes in his own preferences. By imposing progressively stronger restrictions on the primitives of the problem - namely, the discounting function, the utility index...

We consider two-stage "shortlisting procedures" in which the menu of alternatives is first pruned by some process or criterion and then a binary relation is maximized. Given a particular first-stage process, our main result supplies a necessary and sufficient condition for choice data to be...

A discrete symmetry of a preference relation is a mapping from the domain of choice to itself under which preference comparisons are invariant; a continuous symmetry is a one-parameter family of such transformations that includes the identity; and a symmetry field is a vector field whose...

Using the techniques of revealed preference analysis, we study a two-stage model of choice behavior. In the first stage, the decision maker maximizes a menu-dependent binary relation encoding preferences that are imperfectly perceived. In the second, a menu-independent binary relation is...