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An <i>uncovered bargaining solution</i> is a bargaining solution for which there exists a complete and strict relation (tournament) such that, for each feasible set, the bargaining solution set coincides with the uncovered set of the tournament. We provide a characterization of a class of uncovered...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004976635
This paper extends the analysis of liberal principles in social choice recently proposed by Mariotti and Veneziani (2009a) to infinitely-lived societies. First, a novel characterisation of the inegalitarian leximax social welfare relation is provided based on the Individual Benefit Principle,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004998427
This paper analyses Rawls's celebrated difference principle, and its lexicographic extension, in societies with a finite and an infinite number of agents. A unified framework of analysis is set up, which allows one to characterise Rawlsian egalitarian principles by means of a weaker version of a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004998428
A multi-valued choice is weak justified if no chosen alternative is dominated by any other obtainable alternative, and for each discarded alternative there is <i>some</i> chosen alternative which dominates it. This definition allows us to build a connection between the behavioral property expressed by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005106311
I study necessary and sufficient conditions for a choice function to be rationalised in the following sense: there exists a complete asymmetric relation <i>T</i> (a <i>tournament</i>) such that for each feasible (finite) choice situation, the choice coincides with the uncovered set of <i>T</i>. This notion of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005106421
A reason-based choice correspondence rationalizes choice behaviour in terms of a two-stage choice procedure. Given a feasible set <i>S</i>, the individual eliminates from it all of the dominated alternatives according to her fixed (not necessarily complete) strict preference relation, in the first...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005106424
This paper studies implementation problems in the wake of a recent new trend of implementation theory which incorporates a non-consequentialist flavor of the evidence from experimental and behavioral economics into the issues. Specifically, following the seminal works by Matsushima (2008) and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015225628
Given the framework introduced by Dutta and Sen (2012), this paper offers a comprehensive analysis of (Nash) implementation with partially honest agents when there are three or more participants. First, it establishes a condition which is necessary and sufficient for implementation. Second, it...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015237760
In this paper, we introduce the weak and the strong notions of partially honest agents (Dutta and Sen, 2012), and then study implementation by natural price-quantity mechanisms (Saijo et al., 1996, 1999) in pure exchange economies with three or more agents in which pure-consequentialistically...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015237787
We study Nash implementation by natural price-quantity mechanisms in pure exchange economies with free-disposal (Saijo et al., 1996, 1999) where agents have weak/strong intrinsic preferences for honesty (Dutta and Sen, 2012). Firstly, the Walrasian rule is shown to be non-implementable where all...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010457041