We consider a monopoly that sets a price and differentiated referral fees to spread product information along a simple consumer communication network (a chain). The profit-maximizing solution involves standard monopoly pricing and referral fees that provide consumers with strictly positive...

Cooperatives represent an alternative to large-scale corporate farms and plantations as well as to independent unaffiliated small private farms. This paper presents a comparative modeling narrative on cooperative organizational forms' potential impact on equitable rural development. This speaks...

Improving understanding of the complex relationships among financial entities is critically important for risk managers and for financial authorities charged with multiple policy objectives. High quality information is lacking at both the intra- and inter-enterprise levels and to support...

Bank runs may serve to communicate information across agents, and thus enhance rather than thwart allocation efficiency by making the fundamentals determine the asset prices. Figuratively speaking, banks die (go bankrupt) singing a swan song (revealing hidden information). In this way bank runs...

This paper investigates the strategies of a data broker in selling information to one or to two competing firms that can price-discriminate consumers. The data broker can strategically choose any segment of the consumer demand (information structure) to sell to firms that implement third-degree...

This paper aims to inform banks, consumers, researchers, consumer protection organizations and other stakeholders for the importance of these regulations as well as raising some other related issues to be addressed for the protection of mortgage loan consumers. In 2014, EU political reasoning...

This paper introduces a dynamical extension to the theoretical framework proposed by Slim (2009), where the author analyzes price formation in illegal markets. We develop a simple model with two regimes that can show a rich variety of dynamic behaviors, such as cyclical or even chaotic...

We explore through both an economics and regulatory lens the frictions associated with credit rating agencies in the aftermath of the financial crisis. While ratings and other public signals are an efficient response to scale economies in information production, these also can discourage...

We study firms' incentives to acquire private information on cost in a duopoly signaling game. Firms first choose how much to invest in information acquisition and then engage in dynamic price competition. In equilibrium firms acquire too little information from the perspective of industry...

The general idea of this work is to analyse how a banking concentration process can generate information asymmetries causing credit rationing in specific sectors of the economy. To perform this analysis will be used a real and not a theoretical framework as it was the bank concentration process...