We examine a technology-adoption game with network effects in which coordination on either technology A or technology B constitutes a Nash equilibrium. Coordination on technology B is assumed to be payoff dominant. We define a technology’s critical mass as the minimal share of users, which is...

We examine a technology adoption game with network effects in which coordination on technology A and technology B constitute a Nash equilibrium. Coordination on technology B is assumed to be payoff-dominant. We define a technology's critical mass as the minimum share of users necessary to make...

Static demand models for homogeneous network goods give rise to fulfilled-expectations equilibrium demand (FEED) curves, which, contrary to normal demand curves, may be upward sloping at certain intervals. We analyze some, as yet unexplored, properties of the FEED curves. We spell out the...

Successful adoption of urban cellular vehicle-to-everything (C-V2X) services by consumers requires high-density network coverage and a diverse and vibrant community of service providers. This work analyses the economic and technological requirements for a successful smart city platform adoption...

L'une des grandes tendances en matière de communication publicitaire actuellement réside dans la mise en avant d'arguments écologiques, à savoir " toute revendication, indication ou présentation, sous quelque forme que ce soit, utilisée à titre principal ou accessoire dans une publicité,...