We study the political economy of the environment in autocratic, weak and strong democracies when individuals can mitigate the health consequences of domestic pollution privately as well as control pollution collectively through public policies. We consider a small open economy with comparative...

Assume that two players have strict rankings over an even number of indivisible items. We propose algorithms to find allocations of these items that are maximin—maximize the minimum rank of the items that the players receive—and are envy-free and Pareto-optimal if such allocations exist. We...

Condorcet's paradox is one of the most prominent results in social choice theory. It says that there may not exist any alternative that a net majority prefers over every other alternative. When outcomes need not be deterministic alternatives, we show that a similar paradox still exists even if...

This paper considers a contest with an endogenous prize, which is increasing in aggregate efforts of the players. Each player may have a different valuation of the prize and a different ability to convert expenditures to productive efforts. Under standard assumptions in the literature, we prove...

This paper proposes a new school choice mechanism called the recursive Boston mechanism (RBM), which is similar to the well-known Boston mechanism. While the Boston mechanism considers the reduced problem of the original problem after removing students and their assignments in the previous step,...

We extend the concept of non-bossiness to groups of agents and say that a mechanism is group non-bossy if no group of agents can change the assignment of someone else while theirs being unaffected by misreporting their preferences. First, we show that they are not equivalent properties. We,...

A noncooperative game is said to be nonmonetized if the ranges of the utilities (payoffs) of the players are preordered sets. In this paper, we examine some nonmonetized noncooperative games in which both of the collection of strategies and the ranges of the utilities for the players are...

Mathematical foundations of conflict resolutions are deeply rooted in the theory of cooperative and non-cooperative games. While many elementary models of conflicts are formalized, one often raises the question whether game theory and its mathematically developed tools are applicable to actual...

This paper develops alternative models explaining why households with credit need to finance their projects (enterprises) avoid formal credit. More importantly it argues that the problem of avoidance of formal credit and ensuring credit access is not necessarily restricted to the small borrower...

We investigate various properties of the sublevel set G = {x : g(x) ≤ 1} and the integration of h on this sublevel set when g and h are positively homogeneous functions (and in particular homogeneous polynomials). For instance, the latter integral reduces to integrating h exp(-g) on the whole...