The paper deals with rent-seeking behaviour among agents competing for future shares of a common renewable natural resource. Rent-seeking might become profitable when the agents expect that the distribution of the natural resource in future periods will be dependent on the agents' extraction of...

This paper analyzes the efficiency of team production when agents exhibit other regarding preferences. It is shown that full efficiency can be sustained as an equilibrium through a budget-balancing mechanism that punishes some randomly chosen agents if output falls short of efficient level but...

We propose a simple mechanism capable of achieving international agreement on the reduction of harmful emissions to their efficient level. It employs a contest creating incentives among participating nations to simultaneously exert efficient productive and efficient abatement efforts....

In this brief note describes the trajectory of the fractal models/multifractal F/M by Benoit Mandelbrot. The promise was discovered by the geometry of Mandelbrot covers a broad area of research fields, from meteorology and mathematical physics to the individual and collective behavior in...

This paper studies a collective decision problem in which a group of individuals with interdependent preferences vote whether or not to implement a public project of unknown value. A utilitarian social planner aggregates these votes according to a majority rule; but, unlike what is commonly...

This is a substantially revised, refocused, and updated version of an earlier draft paper, exploring the significant role Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) plays in facilitating or impeding legislative and regulatory policy decisions. The paper centers around three case studies of CBAs EPA prepared...

This paper creates a simple model to describe the relationships between, banks, mortgage agencies, mortgage arrangers, and aspiring home owners. Using this model, the author illustrates how slight changes in real estate appreciation assumptions would reverberate through the collateralized debt...

Many economic, political and social environments can be described as contests in which agents exert costly efforts while competing over the distribution of a scarce resource. These environments have been studied using Tullock contests, all-pay auctions and rank-order tournaments. This survey...

It is well-known that a player in a noncooperative game can benefit by publicly restricting his possible moves before play begins. We show that, more generally, a player may benefit by publicly committing to pay an external party an amount that is contingent on the game's outcome. We explore...

Hydraulic fracturing has been a game changer for the energy field, bringing to mind the “nothing in excess” carving at Delphi. Whether heeding ancient oracles or cutting-edge principles of calibration, I argue that dynamic governance innovation can facilitate climate-energy-water balancing...